The Atlas Institute for International Affairs organised a webinar titled “The Autonomous Battlefield: How Technology Is Reshaping Modern Warfare” on 8 October 2026. Darius Creț, co-founder and CEO of Wolf-e Systems, a Romanian defence technology company specialising in unmanned ground and surface vehicles, discussed how emerging technologies are transforming contemporary warfare. His presentation went beyond drones and artificial intelligence to examine the changing economics of warfare, electronic warfare, defence procurement, supply-chain vulnerabilities and the industrial capacity required to sustain military innovation.

Creț placed the Ukraine–Russia war within the history of asymmetric warfare, arguing that the war dynamics visible in Ukraine are not entirely new. He cited the Afghanistan war as an earlier example, where the Taliban, despite possessing fewer resources and much less sophisticated military equipment than the United States and its allies, developed effective responses and tactics such as dispersion, use of networks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as an asymmetric approach.

For Creț, the central lesson from these conflicts is that military advantage is not about technological sophistication or massive spending. It is about how dispersed forces and networks can provide an edge to weaker actors to tackle a conventionally superior adversary. He linked this experience to Ukraine, where networks, drones and rapidly evolving technologies are being used to confront a more powerful opponent.

The Economics of Asymmetric Warfare

A central theme of the presentation was the widening economic imbalance between inexpensive offensive systems and costly defensive platforms. Creț compared the cost of inexpensive interceptor drones with that of Shahed-type drones, while noting that conventional missile interceptors like the Patriot PAC-3 are significantly more expensive. The comparison highlights the growing cost asymmetry between low-cost defensive systems and the more expensive platforms traditionally used to counter incoming threats. He argued that, when low-cost interceptor drones are properly integrated with radar and operated by trained personnel, they could achieve hit rates of up to around 90% against Shahed-type threats. This would offer a better and more sustainable cost-exchange ratio than traditional missile-based air defence.

The same cost asymmetry can be seen across different domains. Creț cited Operation Spiderweb, in which Ukrainian forces used inexpensive FPV drones to strike 41 aircraft across four Russian airbases. At sea, he highlighted that Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels (USVs), including the Magura V5 and Sea Baby, had destroyed roughly one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. This pushed Russian naval assets away from Sevastopol, allowing the reopening of Ukrainian shipping lanes.

The examples highlight the changing cost structure of warfare. The ability to rapidly produce low-cost weapons at scale and adapt them to changing battlefield conditions can create an advantage for smaller and medium-sized militaries, allowing them to impose disproportionate costs on a more powerful adversary.

From Drones to Networks

Creț argued that fully autonomous combat systems remain a possibility, but said he had not yet seen them work independently in actual combat. Instead, unmanned systems are already being used across air, land, sea, electronic warfare and space. In the air domain, these include FPV strike drones, loitering munitions, interceptor drones and long-range strike drones. He noted that FPV drones account for a significant share of Russian battlefield losses, illustrating their growing role in combat.

On land, UGVs are being used extensively for logistics, resupply and medical evacuation, as well as mine-laying, breaching, explosive ordnance disposal and armed missions. Creț highlighted the rapid expansion of UGV operations in Ukraine, with monthly missions rising rapidly in August. He also noted that large quantities of UGVs had been contracted by Ukraine since January 2026. Their importance lies not only in their operational functions but also in their ability to keep soldiers out of the kill zone during logistics and evacuation missions.

At sea, Creț said the most common use of USVs remains strike missions, but Ukraine is developing new roles for them as drone carriers or motherships. Sea drones can transport UGVs towards the shore and deploy them on land, or serve as platforms from which other unmanned systems can be launched. He described one example in which a USV transported and deployed an armed UGV after the systems lost their signal because of electronic warfare.

Creț connected these developments to what he described as an increasingly transparent battlefield. Satellites, high-altitude ISR platforms, aerostats, radars and acoustic sensors provide persistent surveillance, making it increasingly difficult to conceal forces and equipment. Ukraine’s Delta platform contributes to this picture by bringing together different sensor inputs, including ISR, radar and acoustic data, to provide a broader view of battlefield activity. He also noted that satellite communications and ISR support are substantially provided by Ukraine’s allies, given the lack of its own satellite constellation.

The wider significance, according to Creț, is that modern warfare depends increasingly on interconnected networks rather than on individual weapons. Drones may not necessarily be the most powerful weapons available, but their effectiveness comes from how well they are integrated into a broader network of sensors, software, communications and military units. AI can further accelerate this process by helping to close the sense–decide–strike–assess loop within minutes: sensors identify what is happening, software fuses the information and supports decision-making, a suitable weapon or platform conducts the strike, and subsequent sensing assesses its effect. In this environment, Creț argued, defeating a network increasingly requires another network capable of operating across the same interconnected battlespace.

AI, Electronic Warfare and the Kill Chain

Creț stressed that the significance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) lies not simply in autonomous targeting, but in its ability to accelerate the wider kill chain. The process begins with sensing, followed by decision-making, striking and assessment. Drones, satellites and other sensors continuously observe the battlefield, while software can fuse information and help commanders identify appropriate responses. AI can therefore help close the loop from sense to decide, strike and assess in minutes.

This does not mean that individual drones are independently conducting entire combat operations. Rather, AI functions act as a force multiplier within a broader network of sensors, command-and-control systems and weapons. Ukrainian drones, he argued, are highly effective because they operate within decentralised networks capable of adapting rapidly to battlefield conditions.

Electronic warfare also advances technology adoption. Jamming can disrupt radio links and satellite navigation, forcing systems to rely on frequency hopping, alternative control methods, fibre-optic connections or increasingly autonomous guidance. Creț noted that although swarm technology is frequently discussed, Ukrainian commanders have not yet found fully autonomous swarms sufficiently responsive for widespread battlefield use.

The technological transformation of warfare is also changing how military equipment is procured. Creț highlighted Ukraine’s Brave1 platform as an example of a more decentralised approach. Rather than relying entirely on centrally determined procurement, Brave1 functions like a marketplace where companies offer their technologies and individual military units can select what they need. Each battalion receives a certain allocation of tokens, which it can use to acquire specific drones and other systems.

The platform also allows units to choose how different technologies are integrated. For example, a battalion purchasing a particular drone can select a compatible command-and-control system rather than being limited to the default option. This gives soldiers greater flexibility to use systems they are already familiar with and creates numerous combinations between drones, platforms and software. Creț contrasted this model with procurement systems in Europe and the United States, emphasising its decentralised nature and the ability of frontline units to influence the technologies they receive.

Supply Chains and Industrial Capacity

However, rapid innovation does not remove the importance of industrial capacity. Creț identified supply chains as one of the main problems facing the defence industry, drawing on his experience at Wolf-e Systems. The company has faced difficulties procuring hub motors for its UGVs because European industry lacks sufficient access to the magnets required for their production. According to Creț, these magnets are largely sourced from China, leaving European defence manufacturers heavily dependent on Chinese components. The example shows how dependence on a seemingly small component can expose wider vulnerabilities in defence production.

Creț also stressed that new manufacturing technologies should not be mistaken for a substitute for industrial capacity. The ability to produce drones and other systems rapidly still depends on reliable component supply, manufacturing infrastructure and technical expertise. His broader argument was that defence innovation requires not only new technologies but also the industrial base and supply chains capable of producing and sustaining them at scale.

The asymmetry in industrial capacity cuts both ways. Creț contrasted the eight US shipyards, of which only half are used for military purposes, with around 300 shipyards in China, where ships leaving the shipyards are required by law to meet dual-use standards. For Creț, this illustrates a broader point: industrial capacity itself is a form of deterrence. Even systems that are cheap and relatively simple to produce, including 3D-printed drones, still depend on sophisticated industrial capacity, supply chains and skilled workers.

This also raises a dilemma for defence planners: whether to invest in sophisticated platforms such as the F-35 or in the large numbers of cheap drones seen in Ukraine. Since cheap drones can become obsolete within months, Creț argued that countries need the ability to surge production when required, rather than simply stockpiling them. Maintaining this capacity requires active production lines supported by multi-year contracts, dual-use supply chains and a skilled workforce. Critical inputs such as magnets, along with engineers capable of developing new drone technologies, are therefore essential to sustaining defence-industrial capacity.

The Future Battlefield

Creț identified an emerging dilemma for military planners: whether to prioritise sophisticated platforms such as the F-35 or inexpensive systems like those being deployed in Ukraine. His argument suggests that the answer is not necessarily one or the other.

Cheap drones can be rapidly produced, adapted and replaced, but they can also become obsolete within months. At the same time, sophisticated platforms remain necessary for dealing with high-speed and technologically advanced threats that inexpensive systems cannot easily counter. Future militaries will therefore need to integrate both high-end capabilities and low-cost, rapidly iterated systems within a resilient defence ecosystem.

The central lesson from Creț’s presentation is consequently broader than the rise of autonomous weapons. Modern warfare is increasingly shaped by the interaction between technology, economics and industrial capacity. Low-cost drones can alter the cost-exchange ratio; AI can compress the kill chain; electronic warfare can accelerate the demand for autonomy; and decentralised procurement can shorten the path from innovation to battlefield deployment. Yet none of these developments removes the need for resilient supply chains, skilled workers and manufacturing capacity.

In this emerging environment, industrial capacity becomes a component of deterrence itself. The ability to produce, adapt and scale military technology may matter as much as possessing the most sophisticated platform at any given moment. The autonomous battlefield is therefore not simply about machines operating without humans. It is about how quickly military organisations, industries and states can adapt to a battlefield in which technology, software and the economics of warfare are changing simultaneously.

Donald Trump had showcased a grand institutional gesture for peace and reconstruction in Gaza by endorsing his year-ago initiative, the Board of Peace, launched at the World Economic Forum in Davos. He claimed the world is “richer, safer and much more peaceful than it was just one year ago”. Initially created to oversee the Israel–Hamas ceasefire in Gaza, the body soon took on a much broader mandate, raising questions about its membership, the source of its authority, and the conditions attached to its funding. By creating a structure that overlaps with the role of the UN Security Council, the initiative risks weakening established channels of international diplomacy and concentrating decision-making in an ad hoc framework with limited accountability.

US President Donald Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who has no official role within the administration, led the unveiling of a $2.45bn plan for rebuilding Gaza. It consists of 66 programs that would rehabilitate Gaza's infrastructure and economy, destroyed by two years of ​full-scale Israeli military assault. The announcement was made last month during a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. "Obviously, this is a long-term project. It's not something that can happen in six months. But it at least gives people ​hope. Here’s the future that awaits you if everyone does their part." said US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York. US presents a liberal peacebuilding process, while realist power politics within the region would be a fundamental obstacle in the rebuilding journey.

The Reality on the Ground

Despite ambitious reconstruction promises from international agencies, Gaza remains shattered. The latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the World Bank, United Nations, and European Union estimates total recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza at approximately US$71.5 billion. According to reports from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the United Nations, approximately 82% of all buildings in the Gaza Strip have sustained severe damage.

Displacement of people due to war has reached unprecedented levels. Approximately nine out of ten people in Gaza were internally displaced at least once, with nearly the entire population of 2.1 million experiencing repeated displacement. Gaza’s health system is functioning at a fraction of its former capacity, with roughly half its hospitals and primary-care clinics out of service. More than 18,500 patients, including some 4,000 children, are in need of urgent treatment and rebuilding the health sector alone will require more than $400m. Satellite imagery shows damage to schools, with 93% requiring full reconstruction before education can properly resume.

Gaza’s socioeconomic losses since 2023 have erased years of development. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), violence continued across the Gaza Strip, with airstrikes, shelling and gunfire causing further casualties. Between 10 October 2025 and 27 February 2026, the UN Human Rights Office recorded at least 224 Palestinians killed near the “Yellow Line” and 347 in attacks farther away. In the West Bank, tighter movement restrictions since 28 February obstructed ambulances and delayed medical care. WHO recorded nine incidents involving obstructed ambulances, while fuel and cooking-gas shortages further disrupted healthcare, humanitarian operations and essential services.

Some 2.1 million people, almost the entire population of the Gaza Strip, are currently displaced and living within the limits of the “yellow line”, according to the UN. The “Yellow Line”, the ceasefire demarcation separating areas of Israeli military control from territory available to Palestinian civilians, has become a defining feature of post-ceasefire life. As reported in UN News, Safaa Mushtaha, an Al-Tuffah resident, said that asking where the family could move to has become part of their daily lives.“Where do we go?’ This is a question we’ve been asking ourselves for three years,” she said. “We accepted living near the yellow line, but it’s become unbearable.”

Hamas no longer holds formal governmental authority, yet it continues to exercise territorial control, albeit over less than 40 per cent of the Strip. The group is significantly weaker militarily, but it compensates through its political and especially civil institutions. According to the private Israeli monitoring firm Nisaba, Hamas has increasingly relied on Quwat al-Radaa, or “Deterrence Forces”, a covert internal-security unit reportedly tasked with monitoring dissent, suppressing criminal activity and reasserting Hamas’s authority in areas where its formal police presence has weakened.

Why Is the Board of Peace (BoP) Stalled?

In July, President Trump announced that the Board of Peace, endorsed by the UN Security Council, declared it had reached a “historic” agreement with Hamas and other Palestinian factions to decommission their weapons, with a fifteen-point roadmap with Hamas on the group's disarmament and the transfer of civilian and security control of Gaza to a new Palestinian technocratic government, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), to lead the process.

But this peace deal was short-lived, as Hamas said its disarmament was linked to wider political conditions, including the establishment of a Palestinian state, while Israel continued to demand the complete dismantling of Hamas' military capabilities before a full withdrawal.

The pledges of $17 billion remain largely unfulfilled as Gulf donors hesitated without clear financial channels or political guarantees. At the Board of Peace’s February 2026 launch, nine states plus the US committed about $17 billion, but by spring only three- the UAE, Morocco and the US had transferred funds, totalling under $1 billion, while donors signalled that disbursements would be phased and conditional on governance and security arrangements. This led to a lack of trust between countries, and they could not work collectively.

Israel has barred 37 major humanitarian organisations, including Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam, from operating in Israel and the occupied territories after they declined to meet new registration requirements. The bans were imposed because international NGOs have resisted Israeli demands that they reveal biographical details of all Palestinian employees, which the groups say violate privacy laws and fear Israel could use to go after the individuals.

While UNSC Resolution 2803 granted the Board of Peace legislative and executive powers over Gaza, it offered few clear safeguards for the local population, leaving questions over accountability and enforcement. The resolution did not clearly establish mechanisms to protect Palestinian civilians from arbitrary or unaccountable decision‑making by the board. This has also led to the withdrawal of support by some groups. Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto has signalled that Jakarta could withdraw from the “Board of Peace” if it fails to advance Palestinian independence, reflecting Indonesia’s longstanding foreign-policy commitment to Palestinian statehood and sovereignty.

While other UN agencies, including the World Food Programme and World Health Organisation, continued to operate in Gaza, they have stressed that United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) remained the most capable provider of humanitarian assistance. Rather than complementing and cooperating with UNRWA, attempts were made by BoP to establish parallel mechanisms, risking humanitarian operations and weakening the existing UN-led aid infrastructure.

Conclusion: Future Ahead

The International Crisis Group argues that humanitarian aid should not be made dependent on the Hamas disarmament process, as it might leave ordinary Palestinians stuck in humanitarian limbo, while armed groups still hold power. Instead, the group urges that decommissioning of weapons should go step‑by‑step with Israeli withdrawals and be separated from aid delivery. Many Palestinians have expressed serious doubts about the ceasefire agreement, arguing that it has not brought the conflict to an end but instead merely paused the fighting while formalising arrangements that favour Israel.

Israel’s domestic election in October could produce a major political turning point, playing a significant role in international events. But the election offers no obvious choice between fundamentally different visions of Israel’s regional role, as all leading candidates largely agree on the centrality of military power. As Netanyahu gears up for legislative elections, experts worry that Israel could resume full-scale operations after its October elections, with even more destruction and displacement.

Ultimately, Gaza cannot be rebuilt without security and political authority, but the actors controlling security and political authority have not agreed on who should govern Gaza. When the delegations leave, the documents are signed, and the cameras disappear, Palestinians will remain. They will rebuild their homes, restore their communities and carry the consequences of decisions made in their name. Gaza’s future, therefore, cannot merely be designed for Palestinians. It must be shaped with them and, ultimately, by them.

^{The 81st UN General Assembly considers long-standing calls to reform the UN Security Council, September 22, 2026 [Kylie Cooper/Reuters]}

“If the United Nations is to survive, those who represent it must bolster it; those who advocate it must submit to it; and those who believe in it must fight for it.” Norman Cousins, a prominent journalist and peace advocate, uttered these words in 1956. They continue to resonate today, for the UN is hardly a perfect institution.

The UN has grown from 51 founding members in 1945 to 193 members today, representing almost the entire international community. Yet its core decision-making bodies, especially the UN Security Council, remain frozen without reforms in a post–World War II configuration, as decision-making authority over international peace and security remains concentrated in a 15-member Security Council dominated by five permanent veto-wielding states.

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 81) is themed as Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All. Formally opened on September 8, 2026, under the leadership of Dr. Khalilur Rahman, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, which marks a significant moment for Bangladesh's diplomacy. He succeeded Germany's Annalena Baerbock, who presided over the 80th session.

There are currently 65 active armed conflicts in the world, the most since 1946. Two permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and the United States, have started wars in violation of the UN Charter. Meanwhile, tech experts are now warning that AI might wipe out humanity. Accelerating climate change also poses an existential threat.

At the 81st session, the UN appears diluted in authority and increasingly unrepresentative of a multipolar world. Major regions across continents such as Africa, Latin America and large parts of Asia lack permanent representation, making the Security Council appear anachronistic and unrepresentative. This article examines the Global South's growing demand for a more representative multilateral order to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN in the new world order.

UNGA 81: A Global South Agenda

At UNGA 81, Global South states forwarded an agenda anchored in three interconnected themes: resolving devastating conflicts affecting developing countries; securing development, debt relief, and climate finance; and reforming global governance institutions. Global military spending has approached $3 trillion, even as development assistance has fallen sharply and progress on several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has stalled.

The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation’s engagement at the eighty-first General Assembly sought to elevate South-South and triangular cooperation as essential modalities for delivering development impact, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals by launching South-South Galaxy+, and achieving other internationally agreed development goals. The launch of the Global Alliance for South-South and Triangular Cooperation on the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation celebration on 11 September, following the opening of the 81st Session of the General Assembly, was a key milestone, underscored in the subsequent engagements.

Equitable decision-making and equitable development are the need of the hour. Regional conflicts trigger civilian displacement and food insecurity, which rapidly escalate into severe debt and development pressures for vulnerable economies. Across West Asia, escalating conflict threatens some of the world's most important energy and trade routes, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.

For Africa, Security Council reform set the agenda for the week. Kenya’s President William Ruto told the Assembly that “the equality proclaimed in this assembly ends at the doors of the Security Council.” Nigeria, one of Africa’s 54 states which together account for more than a quarter of UN membership, reiterated the Common African Position, calling for two permanent seats with veto rights and five non-permanent seats. Africa's under-representation on the Security Council has become increasingly difficult to defend. Even Germany now explicitly supports stronger African representation.

Ruto noted that African countries borrow at rates two to four times higher than those paid by developed economies. Ghana’s President John Mahama launched the final report of the Accra Reset, A Sovereign Future for Health, which urges Global South countries to take ownership of their health systems under the principle of “no ownership without control.” African nations called for a fair share of decision-making power in the institutions shaping their future.

The UNSC and its Reform Issues.

The Security Council's five permanent members (P5) the US, Russia, China, the UK and France still wield veto power, allowing narrow national interests to override collective security imperatives.

Speaking at the recent BRICS Summit in New Delhi, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres backed the demand from the Global South to expand the UN Security Council, which, he said, will help “bring balance and equity to global systems and institutions”. He also underlined that India has been at the forefront of this demand. Emphasising that today’s economic, demographic and geopolitical realities are not those of 1945, Guterres said that “the institutional structures must reflect it”.

Under the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Security Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, as provided under Article 24(1). Unlike the General Assembly, it can, in principle, take decisions that are binding on all members of the UN. The Council meets throughout the year, mainly to consider armed conflicts and other situations or disputes where international peace and security are threatened.

It is empowered to order mandatory sanctions, call for ceasefires, and authorise military action on behalf of the UN. The Council also, with the General Assembly, has a role in admitting new members to the UN (Article 4(2)), appointing the Secretary-General, and electing judges to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It has also assumed certain other roles not specifically laid down in the Charter, such as the self-conferred role of choosing judges and prosecutors for ad hoc war crimes tribunals, giving the Council a lot of power and creating an unrepresentative instrument of great-power politics.

On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The resolution was established in response to the inability of the Security Council to address the Korean War. The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A, which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall seize itself of the matter.

The Palestinian question has remained unresolved till date, with millions suffering. The Ukraine war continues. Gaza continues to demonstrate the gap between international legal principles and enforcement. Climate commitments routinely outpace implementation. The SDGs remain seriously underfinanced, and the institutional architecture remains substantially rooted in 1945, questioning the framework of the institution. Nations’ sovereignty and international law are violated by the intervention of the major P5 members across the world.

For example, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 showcased how great-power military action can raise questions about state sovereignty, the limits of international law and the role of the UN. Also, UN peacekeepers deployed to conflict-affected regions have multiple times arrived after the most intense hostilities had subsided and a lot of casualties were reported.

In Darfur, Sudan, for instance, delays in the international response allowed mass atrocities to continue. The Darfur case demonstrates the failure of the UN Security Council to act quickly and decisively. Despite evidence of massive human rights abuses, its response remained limited to resolutions, investigations, threats of sanctions and support for an African Union force. Sovereignty concerns and the veto power of P5 members, particularly China, constrained stronger collective action.

Similar failures of international peacekeeping and protection were evident during the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. A lack of resources and a lack of the commitment necessary to prevent genocide constituted the overriding failure behind what happened in Rwanda in 1994. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was slow to be set up, suffered from administrative difficulties and lacked sufficient troops and equipment, said Ingvar Carlsson, the Chairman of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide.

Following major failures in peacekeeping during the 1990s, including the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the crisis in Somalia, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel examined why the UN had failed to protect civilians and prevent atrocities. Annan’s report openly acknowledged these failures, accepting that the UN and the wider international community shared responsibility for not acting effectively to prevent the genocide and protect vulnerable populations.

The UN continues to reflect realist principles within a broader liberal institutional order. This tension has contributed to stagnation in global governance, highlighting the need for institutional reform and renewal to make multilateralism more effective and results-oriented. The 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1) called for negotiations on Security Council reform to continue in the General Assembly, calling for an expansion of the Council to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent, but there has been no major change in the system.

Attempts to reform the Security Council have focused primarily on membership expansion and veto modification, but removing or restricting the veto requires amending the UN Charter, which itself requires the unanimous approval of the P-5, who refuse to voluntarily surrender their privilege as it harms their national interest. Nominations for permanent seats trigger intense opposition from regional neighbors, such as Pakistan opposing India, Argentina opposing Brazil, and several European states resisting Germany.

Who Funds the United Nations?

The United Nations is financed through two primary mechanisms: first are mandatory assessed contributions accounting for about 45% of total funding, and second is voluntary contributions, which account for roughly 55%. Just nine countries, namely the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, and China, combine to pay roughly 75% of the UN’s total core operating budget. The United States is the largest single contributor to the organisation, paying up to 22% maximum for the regular budget and 25–27% of overall peacekeeping costs.

As UN Programs and Funds rely on voluntary contributions, their budgets are chronically uncertain, which forces agencies to dedicate significant effort to ongoing fundraising rather than core operations. For instance, at the end of 2006, member states owed the UN $2.3 billion in unpaid arrears, with the United States accounting for 43% of that total debt. This financial dependency grants "big payers" an effective stranglehold over the UN's operational capacity, creating a dependency chain for developing nations that rely on UN assistance.

Financial leverage directly reinforces U.S. hegemony within the UN system and broader international governance. As both the largest financial contributor and a permanent Security Council member with veto power, the U.S. possesses disproportionate capacity to direct, enable, or block UN initiatives according to its national interest, often operating as a unipolar hegemon. This financial dominance is even more structural in affiliated institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Conclusion: Future Ahead

Countries including China, Japan, Türkiye, Morocco, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and the Philippines promoted South-South and triangular cooperation at the 81st General Assembly. Their initiatives focused on digital transformation, development finance, science, regional integration, green industrialisation, and technology-sharing.

More than eight decades after its establishment, the United Nations remains an important institution of international cooperation, but its limitations have become increasingly difficult to ignore. Its core challenge is the persistent gap between its ambitious founding goals and its operational capacities.

As former U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. succinctly observed, "This organisation is created to prevent you from going to hell. It isn't created to take you to heaven". The basic problem for the UN as the overseer of international security was and remains simple: how to deal with conflicts, be they between or within states, without offending national sovereignty.

The UN cannot become the “definite guaranty of peace” that Woodrow Wilson had envisioned for the League of Nations. As long as the nation-state remains the basic form of political organisation, national interests continue to shape state behaviour, and governments remain responsible for the welfare of their citizens, the UN will have limited ability to act independently. In this sense, the UN remains fundamentally an instrument of its member states, even though many contemporary security threats no longer originate primarily from states but from internal conflicts and transnational groups.

The 1999 Kargil conflict was fought in the mountainous region along the Kargil–Dras sector of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict represented the first direct military clash between two nuclear-armed states since the 1969 Sino-Soviet border dispute over Damanskii (Zhenbao to the Chinese) Island in the Ussuri River. The Kargil War of 1999 occurred less than a year after India and Pakistan openly conducted nuclear tests at Pokhran and Chagai in May 1998, creating a potential scenario for nuclear escalation.

In Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, editor Peter R. Lavoy brings together Indian, Pakistani, and American analysts to dissect the study of the war and analyse the critical turning point in the conflict. Conventional militaries consider asymmetric warfare a form of irregular warfare. Used as an umbrella term to describe what is also called guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, rebellion, terrorism, and counterterrorism. The book examines the conflict through aspects: the strategic calculus of asymmetric warfare, the dynamics of crisis management, and the systemic factors that drove the regional military conflict and how it led to an international security crisis.

The volume conceptualises asymmetric warfare through Pakistan’s reliance on stealth, surprise infiltration, and terrain exploitation along the high-altitude peaks of Kashmir above 12,000 and 17,000 feet, and deploying artillery in rugged Himalayan passes. Contributors analyse and project that Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI) executed a “fait accompli” strategy. Alexander George and Richard Smoke discuss these strategies in their classic Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice.

A fait accompli strategy involves taking swift, unilateral action to alter the status quo and presenting an adversary with a new reality that is difficult to reverse without incurring significant costs. Strategically, the book explores how this war was shaped by the “stability-instability paradox”, which posits that a stable strategic nuclear balance makes escalation from a low level of conflict to the nuclear level highly unlikely, and thus paradoxically permits offensive military operations at a low level.

The conflict began in the spring of 1999 when Indian soldiers patrolling near Kargil, about five miles inside India’s side of the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC), came under fire from positions on the frozen peaks of the Great Himalayan range. For several weeks, Indian officials believed Kashmiri militants had carried out the attacks. They later established that well-trained troops from Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI) had infiltrated the area and that the operation was much larger and better organised than it was initially believed.

Pakistan raised its attacks by using concealment, deception, and surprise methods that its military believed India would not anticipate. They calculated that capturing and holding strategically superior terrain, combined with a carefully planned strategy, would create a military fait accompli. Pakistan expected that India would be unable to remove its forces before winter, when the harsh conditions would effectively freeze the positions in place and allow Pakistan to resupply its forward posts and consolidate its territorial gains across the LoC.

However, Pakistan underestimated India’s determination and ability to turn an unconventional confrontation into a conventional military campaign. Pakistan could no longer sustain its asymmetric approach, and India brought its substantial conventional military resources to fight against the occupied positions. Pakistan initially succeeded in repelling Indian attacks. But later India increased the number of troops and the firepower deployed.

By the third week of May 1999, the Indian Army had launched a large-scale counteroffensive, codenamed Operation Vijay. The Indian Air Force joined the campaign on 26 May, conducting air strikes in support of ground operations and thereby escalating the conflict vertically. The Indian Navy also responded swiftly against an unprepared Pakistani naval force, positioning itself to potentially impose a blockade around Karachi. Such a blockade could have had serious consequences for Pakistan, particularly given its critically low energy reserves.

Pakistan’s military tried to ensure the closure of the Zojila Pass which served as India’s main route from the Kashmir Valley toward the northern LoC and Ladakh. Normally, it is covered by snow from mid-November until early June, but in 1999, the pass became accessible in early May. This allowed India to move troops, supporting formations, and essential supplies into the area earlier than Pakistan had anticipated. The opening also enabled India to transport the logistical resources required for its counteroffensive strategy, including approximately 19,000 tons of ammunition.

India initially had a hard time eliminating Pakistani troops from their positions on the mountain heights. Indian forces had a significant breakthrough in the third week of June, when they captured two positions along the Tololing Ridge in the Dras sector. The Tololing complex represented Pakistan’s closest advance movement into the Dras sector and the region held considerable strategic importance. Pakistani troops occupying the position could hinder the movement of Indian forces toward other positions along the LoC. Following almost a week of intense close-quarters combat, India’s 56 Mountain Brigade captured Point 4590 on 17 June and Point 5140 on 20 June, securing the entire Tololing Ridge.

Brigadier (Retd.) Khushal Thakur, who commanded the 18 Grenadiers during the 1999 conflict, described the Battle of Tololing as the toughest phase of ‘Operation Vijay’ and the definitive turning point that shifted the course of the war. Pakistan had a tactically weak defensive strategy, which was combined with shortages of manpower, equipment, and logistical support, making it difficult to sustain its positions in the .

While Pakistan’s reliance on militant groups made Indian forces engage in a prolonged and costly counterinsurgency campaign, the Kargil conflict shifted the confrontation into a domain where India held a distinct advantage: superior conventional military power.

The costs of war for Pakistan included the lives of NLI soldiers, tactical military advantages that might otherwise have been useful in a larger war, and damage to Pakistan’s international reputation. Pakistan had historically demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice considerable resources to sustain its position on Kashmir.

After two months of intense military warfare from both sides at altitudes between 12,000 and 17,000 feet, which cost both sides several hundred soldiers, Pakistan ordered its forces to withdraw, bringing the conflict to an end.

International pressure played a significant role in bringing the Kargil confrontation to an end. The United States, along with Britain, Russia, China, France, and Saudi Arabia, pressed Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Indian-administered Kashmir while urging both sides to halt the fighting. Collectively, these efforts revealed an important feature of the nuclear revolution: external powers may intervene actively in crises involving nuclear-armed states to contain escalation and discourage attempts to exploit the threat of nuclear war to alter existing territorial and political arrangements.

Parvez Musharraf emphasised the conflict, stating: “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict.” The Kargil episode demonstrated the extent to which Pakistan was prepared to bear high costs in defending its position on Kashmir, which it regards as important to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Kargil attack came as a complete surprise to the Indian government, military, and intelligence agencies, prompting widespread recognition of a systemic failure of the agencies. Following recommendations from the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers, India established the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), created the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) for technical intelligence, instituted a full-time National Security Advisor (NSA), and integrated military intelligence with civilian agencies like RAW and the Intelligence Bureau.

Later, India prioritised major technological acquisitions, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), satellite imagery, high-altitude night-vision equipment, and American Firefinder weapon-locating radar systems. India addressed the fragmented border management by deploying Army units in Jammu & Kashmir to focus strictly on policing the Line of Control (LoC) rather than being diverted to counterinsurgency duties. The Indian Army raised 14 Corps in Ladakh to manage the northern LoC, also constructed permanent high-altitude posts, and initiated all-weather road and tunnel projects (such as the Zojila Pass tunnel) to eliminate total reliance on the vulnerable National Highway 1A.

The Lahore Summit of 1999 was a historic meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 20–21 February 1999, culminating in the signing of the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999. But surprise Pakistani attacks made the declaration invalid, and India moved away from an opaque nuclear posture toward formalising its National Command Authority, testing the Agni-I ballistic missile, and seeking escalation dominance.

Pakistan’s internal military reviews identified severe tactical and logistical flaws, specifically that troops were deployed across undefended mountain ridges. Also, isolated and distant outposts were unable to get resupply or hold out against constant counterattacks by Indian forces. The defensive paramilitary forces (the Northern Light Infantry) could not maintain captured territory against a determined, large-scale conventional assault.

The operation was planned by a small military cell within top army leadership, excluding the Navy, Air Force, Foreign Office, Cabinet, and key directorates within General Headquarters (GHQ). The public blame game between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf damaged the political structure internally and directly set the stage for the October 1999 military coup. Along with Pak Army regulars, some elements of Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were responsible for crossing the LOC and occupying important heights as well as areas of tactical importance right from Mushkoh Valley in Drass to Chorbat La in Batalik and beyond to Turtuk in the North. Insisting on the cover story that the intruders were “mujahideen” destroyed Pakistan’s international credibility.

By employing a small force of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops, Pakistan temporarily tied down over four Indian army divisions and compelled India to mobilise its national military resources. Ultimately, the asymmetric strategy failed because India “conventionalised” the conflict. Additionally, by employing Bofors heavy artillery, air strikes, and coordinated infantry assaults, India dismantled Pakistan’s static positions, showcasing that short-term asymmetric gains could not be sustained against a superior conventional power willing to bear high costs.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied groups launched a military offensive attack in Tigray, Afar and Amhara in Ethiopia on 23 September 2026. The TPLF says that it started a "defensive war" against the federal government of Ethiopia. Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF), the military wing of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), seized Alula Aba Nega International Airport in Mekelle. Ethiopian Airlines subsequently suspended flights to Mekelle, Axum, and Shire.

A return to civil war in Tigray is now highly likely. The TPLF have declared the African Union-brokered Pretoria Agreement, which ended the Tigray conflict, “effectively dead”, with Debretsion (an Ethiopian politician serving as the chairman of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). He was previously the president of the Tigray Region.) having consistently criticised its implementation. The capture of Mekelle’s airport has significantly escalated regional tensions and made headlines in international news.

Seven Ethiopian armed groups, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the ​Amhara Fano National Movement, allied. They aimed at overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. Fano, a coalition of armed groups from the Amhara region, fought to support the federal government against ⁠the ⁠TPLF during the 2020-2022 Tigray war. The announcement ​of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival brought together an ethnically diverse body of groups based across the country, from Tigray in the north ‌to the Somali Region in the south.

From 2020 to 2022, Ethiopia was devastated by a civil war between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Tigray’s regional leadership. The conflict drew in neighbouring regions and foreign troops from Eritrea, leading to a humanitarian crisis that displaced millions and left hundreds of thousands dead.

While a peace agreement paused the worst of the bloodshed in late 2022, it left a lot of the political and territorial disputes unresolved, which is bringing turmoil in the present.

How the Conflict Began

The roots of the crisis lie in Ethiopia’s post-2018 political transformation. The EPRDF(Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), a coalition dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until 2019 by overthrowing the Derg government in 1991.

The 2014–2016 protests consisted of large-scale demonstrations and civil unrest by Ethiopia's Oromo population, opposing the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government's Addis Ababa and Surrounding Oromia Integrated Development Plan.

The 2014 Addis Ababa Master Plan was a controversial plan to expand the boundaries of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, by 1.1 million hectares into the Oromia Special Zone in April 2014 for urban expansion, industrialisation, and infrastructure. The proposed expansion of the boundaries of Addis Ababa ignited the 2014–2016 Oromo protests beginning on 25 April 2014; to which the government responded by shooting at and beating peaceful protesters.

More widespread strikes and street protests resumed on 12 November 2015; largely led by students in Ginchi (located 80 km southwest of Addis Ababa and encircled by the Oromia region). Protests spread throughout 400 different locales across 17 zones of the Oromia region, and according to Amnesty International 800 of these protestors were killed. On 12 January 2016, after two months of protests, the Oromo Democratic Party said that the plan was “fully terminated” after extensive meetings with government officials who rejected it.

The protests in the Amhara Region began in Gondar in 2016 and quickly spread across the region. It was driven by disputes over Welkait and administrative boundaries. Although the protests were different in character, both movements challenged the dominance of the EPRDF. Protesters faced mass arrests and restrictions on peaceful assembly. Ethiopian security forces used live ammunition during the protests, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths across the two regions. Tens of thousands of people, including citizens, journalists and political leaders, were also arbitrarily arrested.

Subsequently, EPRDF elected Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister (PM) in March 2018. After becoming prime minister in 2018, Abiy Ahmed sought to replace the ethnically based EPRDF coalition with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party. In 2019, he dissolved the EPRDF and formed the Prosperity Party. But the refusal of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to join and become part of the new party highlights the emergence of the future conflict between them.

^{Ethiopian government soldiers ride in the back of a truck near Agula, north of Mekele in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, on May 8, 2021 [Ben Curtis/AP]}

Relations between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF worsened because of disagreements over federalism, political authority and constitutional legitimacy. Tigray’s regional leadership conducted its own regional election in September 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, which the federal Abiy’s government later declared unlawful. In November 2020, fighting erupted after an attack on federal military installations in Tigray.

In November 2020, war broke out in Tigray between the federal government and the regional government. The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) occupied Tigray's capital of Mekelle, leading the civil war. The TPLF fought a bloody war against Ethiopia’s federal government and its allies in Eritrea and the Amhara militias known as Fano. Tigrayan forces retook the regional capital of Mekelle from the ENDF in June 2021. A month later, Addis Ababa announced the results of a national parliamentary election, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won in a landslide.

The TPLF boycotted the election, and opposition leadership in parliament accused the Abiy government of banning poll observers in some states. In November 2021, Tigrayan troops and allied Oromo militants marched within eighty-five miles of the capital but were forced back north by ENDF forces. The conflict divided Ethiopia along regional and ethnic lines. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) fought alongside Tigrayan forces, while Fano and Amhara Regional Special Forces, together with Afar Regional Special Forces, fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal forces.

The Ethiopian war has had a devastating impact on human rights and civil society. The conflict has resulted in mass killings, widespread sexual violence, forced displacement, and the destruction of healthcare and education infrastructure. The UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) has documented these violations.

Pretoria: A Fragile Settlement

Following the break-out of violent conflict in the Tigray Region of Northern Ethiopia on 03 November 2020, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat appointed H.E Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa on 26 August 2021. The Chairperson subsequently set up a High-Level Panel for peace efforts in Ethiopia. After months of sustained efforts to assist the Parties in finding a political solution to the conflict, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) convened for their first direct Talks

The Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities was signed in Pretoria on 2 November 2022 under African Union mediation. Earlier, on 7 September 2022, TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael appealed to the UN for a cessation of hostilities, calling for humanitarian access, the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the restoration of Tigray’s pre-war borders.

Direct AU-mediated talks between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF began in South Africa on 25 October 2022, for the restoration of peace, security and stability in the Tigray Region. The Pretoria agreement had 15 articles covering objectives, principles, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, confidence-building measures, re-establishing federal authority over Tigray, and controlling borders and facilities. It also prescribed transitional arrangements and procedures for monitoring, verification and compliance.

Ten days later, on 12 November, they signed the Nairobi Declaration in Kenya, setting out further arrangements for the disarmament of Tigrayan forces.

Why Is the Peace Breaking Down?

While the agreement ended large-scale conventional warfare, Pretoria was not a comprehensive settlement of every political dispute in the region. The Pretoria Agreement contains several weaknesses. Article 1(2) and Article 3(4) create ambiguity over the scope of restoring constitutional order. Article 3(1) does not establish a clear mechanism for the disengagement and repatriation of Eritrean forces. Provisions on Internally Displaced Persons and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration also lack clear timelines, while Article 2(e) does not clearly define continental actors’ role in political dialogue.

In the months before 22 September, the TPLF was reportedly involved in forced recruitment and increased military preparations. On August 20th the Ethiopian government attacked Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, with fighter jets and drones. The strikes reportedly injured 13 people, including children. From August 24th to August 27th, Tigray was bombed at least once a day. One drone strike in the south on August 26th destroyed a school. This also led to the failure of the peace agreement and led to recent military strikes.

The 2026 Pretoria Agreement Implementation Report (PAIR) reveals systematic failure across virtually all substantive provisions. Research with over 100 participants found that the agreement delivered negative peace while positive peace remains elusive. Ethiopia's failure to fully implement it has triggered renewed clashes between the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) in occupied Tigrayan territories. These clashes in late January 2026 were followed by ENDF drone strikes that killed at least one person in central Tigray, and the Federal government’s cancellation of all flights to the region a suspension that was lifted and reinstated several times since. The Ethiopian government has also been deploying thousands of its soldiers to Tigray’s borders and across the region, while tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also reaching a new high.

While the African Union verified the disarmament of Tigray Defense Force (TDF) heavy weapons, the process was premature and poorly sequenced. Disarmament was completed without guarantees that occupied territories would be vacated or that Tigray's civilian population would be protected. Reintegration packages of approximately ETB 90,000 (USD 1,300) were deemed grossly inadequate, and female ex-combatants were systematically excluded from reintegration programs and vocational training. The absence of Tigray from the 2026 national election further deepened doubts about whether the region had been fully reintegrated into Ethiopia’s constitutional order.

Due to massive USAID funding cuts, Food aid had declined by over 56% since January 2025, with beneficiaries dropping from 1.66 million to just 726,000 by November 2025. A 2024 study found that starvation was the leading cause of death across all age groups in Tigray between November 2022 and August 2023, accounting for 49.3% of verified deaths, with children under five at particularly high risk. The same 2024 study found that over 300 Internally Displaced People died at Hitsats IDP Camp over eight months.

Regional and International Implications

Jalale Getachew Birru, a senior analyst for East Africa at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), also stressed that the conflict cannot be viewed in isolation.

Ethiopia’s renewed Tigray conflict is related to a wider pattern of instability across the Horn of Africa, which involves neighbouring Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti. In Afar (an administrative region in northeastern Ethiopia), fighting threatens the transport corridor to Djibouti, through which much of landlocked Ethiopia’s international trade passes. Beyond Afar lies Eritrea, whose relations with Addis Ababa have deteriorated over Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian forces against TPLF during the 2020–2022 war. However, Eritrea’s possible involvement in the renewed fighting remains difficult to establish independently. After the war, however, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated. One major source of tension is Ethiopia's pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea, particularly through Eritrea. Eritrea views Ethiopia's maritime ambitions through the lens of its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Army 70 is a TPLF-linked armed unit of several thousand fighters that formed in eastern Sudan after fleeing the 2020–2022 Tigray war, with some reportedly fighting alongside Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Sudan has been at war since 2023 between the SAF and the RSF. RSF is a paramilitary force led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, and has been fighting Sudan’s regular army. Martin Plaut, a journalist and Horn of Africa expert and former Africa editor of BBC World Service News, argues that "The Ethiopians are on the side of the RSF and Hemedti." "There has been strong evidence that there is a base in western Ethiopia which is supplying and training RSF fighters."

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping choke points, connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Eritrea and Djibouti lie on its western side, Yemen on the eastern side. The war in Yemen has already shown disruption of international shipping in the Red Sea. For Ethiopia, the instability is significant because the country depends heavily on access to ports and trade routes through the Red Sea, particularly via Djibouti. The ongoing instability will critically impact its economy and people.

Conclusion: Peace Under Pressure

Tigray suffers from political fragmentation and repression, including crackdowns on media and the controversial realignment of former leaders with the federal government. The federal government’s proposal to hold a referendum on contested areas was rejected by the Tigray Interim Administration as unconstitutional.

The war caused mass displacement, famine-like conditions and the collapse of essential services, with researchers estimating that hundreds of thousands of people died through direct violence, hunger and the destruction of healthcare systems.

Furthermore, the conflict has been absorbed into a volatile global proxy war, where competing alliance systems involving the Middle East and the US-Iran war threaten to turn the Horn of Africa into a wider regional battlefield. Its future depends on more than renewed ceasefire diplomacy. Ethiopia needs credible security guarantees, the resolution of Western Tigray’s status, safe returns for displaced people, political inclusion and accountability for abuses.

As, the US- China relationship is strained by various debates arising from trade tariffs, the Taiwan issue, and the use of artificial intelligence. Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, is all set to visit America from September 23 to 25 at the invitation of President Donald Trump. Peng Liyuan, wife of Chinese President Xi Jinping, will accompany him on his three-day state visit to the United States. Xi will visit the White House after a decade and meet Trump.

US President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump will host Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan across Washington during the visit. The itinerary includes a White House welcome, a state dinner at which both presidents speak, a private tea, and a tour of the United States’ founding documents. It will be a third meeting of Trump and Xi after Trump’s second presidential term. The first was in Busan in October, followed by Beijing this past May.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said, "We're not looking for a giant comprehensive ​trade agreement ​with ​China. We're looking ‌to manage this relationship," he said in an interview on a Fox News show.

Xi will probably raise Taiwan during his expected summit with Trump on 24 September. China’s Xi Jinping is expected to press US President Donald Trump to halt Taiwan arms ​sales under a 1982 joint statement during the visit. China regularly ‌describes the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing views as its own territory, as its most sensitive and important diplomatic issue and has repeatedly called for arms sales to stop. Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.

Speaking at a defence forum in Beijing, China’s former envoy to Washington Cui Tiankai said “reunification” with Taiwan would bring stability that is “in the interest of the United States.” Ahead of the summit, Taipei has been clearly conveying its positions to the US side, Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung told reporters in Taipei “We hope ... there will be no situation that harms Taiwan,” he said.

Apocalyptic warnings about the danger of uncontrolled artificial intelligence are adding new urgency to talks between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Recently, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei proposed to “slow the pace” of artificial intelligence (AI) development amid rising safety concerns, a call that was quickly joined by OpenAI’s Sam Altman, Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis, and SpaceXAI’s Elon Musk. The new push comes after increasing reports of out-of-control AI and researchers raising alarm about the risks to humanity. Trump earlier this week told reporters AI would be among many things being discussed in the visit, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Axios he’s open to talks about “shared risks” around AI in talks with Chinese counterparts.

China’s restrictions on exports of crucial rare-earth metals and rare-earth magnets remain one of the important unresolved issues as President Trump and Xi Jinping prepare to meet.

As China leads global production of rare-earth metals, which are essential for making products ranging from cars and wind turbines to semiconductors, computer displays and military equipment, there have been difficulties for imports to manufacturers in multiple countries like the United States, Europe, Japan and India.

China imposed export controls in April 2025 on seven kinds of rare earths and magnets made from them. It later announced a broader set of restrictions, now scheduled to take effect Nov. 10. And in a political dispute, China has slashed shipments of rare earths and magnets to Japan, disrupting supply chains that also serve American manufacturers. All three issues the existing controls, the Nov. 10 restrictions and the curbs on Japan are expected to loom over the meeting between Mr Trump and Mr Xi, China’s top leader. There is little indication so far of how they might be resolved.

China keeps close ties with Tehran and buys far more Iranian oil than any other country. Washington believes President Xi Jinping can pressure Iran more than anyone else, but Xi has shown little willingness to do so. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Trump and Xi will keep discussing China’s financial links to Tehran during their summit. Last week, Trump dismissed a report that said Iran had obtained satellite images of a U.S. base in Jordan from Chinese entities before an attack in July that killed three American troops.

Iran has used a barter-like arrangement to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and buy billions of dollars’ ⁠worth of ⁠goods from China, including military gear, two senior Iranian sources and three other people familiar ⁠with the matter told Reuters. The secretive trade mechanism, in which Iranian oil is exchanged for credits for Chinese imports, has provided a financial lifeline for Tehran in recent years as the United States stepped up economic and ​military pressure over its nuclear program, according to the sources. This can be a major issue of discussion during the summit.

Key topics include the US-China trade truce that is set to expire on November 10. Both sides will reduce tariffs through the “30 by 30” deal, meaning each country will remove existing tariffs on $30 billion of imported goods. Observers widely expect this announcement, so any failure to deliver it will signal trade trouble in the bilateral relations. China may also announce new purchase agreements on soybeans and Boeing. China already announced several purchases in May, but it can now increase or formalise those numbers in September.

China also likely wants to use this meeting to set the conditions for future meetings. Xi will likely push for Trump to visit China in November for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting. If Trump makes that trip, the two sides have already agreed that Xi would reciprocate by attending the Group of Twenty (G20) Miami summit in December.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in person for the first time in nine years, at a gathering hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping and skip the Group of 20 summit in the United States. Analysts read the contrast as a strategy of keeping distance from Washington, which is pressing Moscow to end its war in Ukraine, while drawing closer to Beijing.

The chances that Putin will sit down with U.S. President Donald Trump at the G-20 in Florida are very low, Bloomberg reported on the 22nd September 2026. Xi will host APEC leaders in Shenzhen, China, for two days starting Nov. 18. Russian officials have floated the possibility that the meeting could produce an unprecedented three-way summit among the leaders of the world’s three largest nuclear powers.

The Iran War, trade and defence agreements and also Washington’s viewpoint of Taiwan will be on the agenda, as the meeting will set the direction for future US-China engagement in the coming months ahead this year in APEC and G20. The relationship can only be stabilised through direct, personal interaction to bring long-term growth in both regions.

On Sept. 4, 2026, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Equal Earth projection, an equal-area world map published in 2018, and encouraged governments, schools, media, and technology platforms to use it wherever the comparative size of continents matters.

The United States cast the sole vote against, dismissing the initiative. Yaryna Ferencevych, the U.S. deputy representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, described the initiative as part of a broader “radical ideological project” being pursued by the U.N. when it should be focused on “genuine problems of international peace, prosperity, or good relations.” “Resolutions like this and the ideological agenda they promote are barnacles on our work here, and the reason this institution is losing its credibility,” she said.

“Maps shape our understanding of the world,” Robert Dussey, Togo’s foreign minister, said before the vote. “They guide education, nourish the imagination, and influence collective perceptions.” The vote followed a “Correct the Map” campaign backed by the African Union and led by Togo, and was passed with the support of 164 nations, including France and the UK. Six countries, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine, abstained.

The campaign argued that the Mercator map, developed in 1569, misrepresents the size of continents, particularly Africa, and carries unfair connotations of power and privilege. In 1569, Dutch cartographer Gerardus Mercator created a world map using what is now known as the Mercator projection. On this map, all meridians are drawn as parallel vertical lines. In geometry, a straight line crossing parallel lines forms the same angle with each one. As a result, a straight line drawn across a Mercator map represents a constant direction.

For sailors, the Mercator map made navigation much easier. They could draw a straight line in the direction they wanted to travel and use it to guide their journey. Because of this advantage, the map remained widely used for centuries, especially during the age of navigation comfort in the seas.

However, it does not portray the true size of landmasses covering areas. Regions nearer to the North and South Poles appear much larger than they actually are, while regions near the Equator appear smaller. This leads to an outcome that the US, Europe and Russia look unusually large in visual effect. The clearest example is Greenland, which appears almost as large as Africa even though Africa is actually about 14 times bigger.

In 2018, three scientists, Bojan Šavrič, Tom Patterson and Bernhard Jenny, developed the Equal Earth projection to accurately reproduce the proportional areas of the continents. On maps produced using this method, areas near the Equator, including Africa, Latin America and South Asia, appear substantially larger, while the US, Europe and Russia look smaller. The Equal Earth map projection is a new equal-area pseudocylindrical projection for world maps. It is inspired by the widely used Robinson projection, but unlike the Robinson projection, it retains the relative size of areas.

Meanwhile, Ukraine voiced objections over how some maps relying on Equal Earth portray Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, according to the U.N. However, the Eastern European country supported actions to more accurately depict Africa’s size. The campaign has attracted support for the equal projection map beyond the African region. The Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission has also endorsed shifting away from Mercator and highlighted the issue of equal historical representation. Latin American governments also appeared as the resolution’s supporters. Countries like Belize, Brazil, Costa Rica and Nicaragua were listed among the states supporting the draft.

France has chosen Eckert IV for official mapping, demonstrating that the debate does not centre on a single replacement for Mercator. Eckert IV is an equal-area pseudocylindrical map projection for world maps. The lateral meridians are semicircles, which give the projection a rounded shape and smooth corners where the lateral meridians meet the pole lines. This projection is commonly used for thematic and other world maps requiring accurate areas.

The debate over the world map is therefore about more than cartographic accuracy and traces to rightful historical representation of maps. The Mercator map remains a useful tool for navigation, but its use in classrooms, newsrooms and public institutions has shaped a distorted image of the world representation in the map.

It is essential that geographic representation should be given in a map according to the physical area of the region to offer a fairer representation of Africa and the wider Global South. This would change how people see the world and whose place within it is visually recognised.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels march during a mobilisation campaign in Sanaa, Yemen, Thursday, Sept. 10, 2026.

Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have reportedly captured the strategic Perim Island that sits in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as they aim to tighten their grip on the critical maritime chokepoint. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait links Asia to Europe via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The strait carries 12% of global trade, with millions of oil barrels. Perim Island, also known as Mayun, divides the waterway in two, close to its narrowest point. Between September 9 and September 11, the Houthis captured several important towns, including Hays, Al-Khawkhah, the key port city of Mocha, and Dhubab. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said they captured about 5,400 square kilometres, or around 90 per cent of Yemen’s western Red Sea coastline. As Houthi forces launched a major offensive against government positions across Taiz and Hodeidah, the government-backed Joint Forces reported holding their lines and launching counterattacks.

Saudi Arabia had to shut down a major pipeline a day after drones attacked it. Saudi Arabia said that the drones came from Iraq, which is home to Iranian-backed militias. Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels simultaneously captured the strategic island at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, opening a new chapter in the regional conflict. Saudi Arabia, calling it a precautionary measure, temporarily shut down its Petroline, the 1,201-kilometre East-West pipeline running from Abqaiq to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. As Riyadh was relying on this pipeline to bypass the blockaded maritime straits, its closure compounds an ongoing export crisis that had already driven Saudi crude oil shipments to a 13-year low.

Axios reported, citing two US officials, that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called US President Donald Trump twice to urge him to launch strikes against Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen as the group advanced towards the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthi advance is not only an embarrassment for Saudi Arabia. It also gives Iran new leverage in its war with America: its allies have bolstered their grip on another vital waterway.

The Saudi–Houthi conflict is not simply a Sunni–Shia religious war. The Saudi–Houthi conflict grew out of Yemen’s internal political crisis and continued as a part of the wider Saudi–Iran rivalry. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement from northern Yemen, seized Sana’a in 2014. They expanded southward, weakening the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, which led him to flee the country. Saudi Arabia viewed their rise as a threat to its border security and feared growing Iranian influence in Yemen, as Iranians provided armed and economic assistance to Houthis. After Hadi requested military assistance, Saudi Arabia formed an Arab coalition and launched Operation Decisive Storm on 26 March 2015. The campaign relied mainly on-air strikes, naval pressure and support for anti-Houthi forces. The operation failed to remove the Houthis from Sana’a or restore the Hadi government’s control over Yemen but degraded Houthi military capabilities, particularly heavy weapons and ballistic-missile assets, and secured control of Yemeni airspace and surrounding waters. The Saudi intervention increased Houthi hostility towards Saudi Arabia and made Riyadh one of their main enemies

This year’s clash between Saudi and Houthi forces can also be related to an event on July 13, when Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces carried out an airstrike on Sana’a Airport’s runway to stop an unauthorised Iranian aircraft from landing, forcing it to divert. This followed a July 3 incident where an Iranian flight transported Houthis to Khamenei’s funeral, violating government sovereignty. In retaliation for the runway attack, the Houthis launched strikes against Saudi Arabia’s Abha Airport. This clash marks the most severe escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis since the 2022 truce, with Houthis vowing to end their airspace blockade. A return to serious fighting looked inevitable, and it was obvious that the Houthis would try to seize the coast.

What is interesting to see is Pakistan’s silence on the attacks by the Houthis. Pakistan, which shows itself as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia and relies on Saudi assistance and remittances, is also a signatory to the much-talked-about Mecca Pact, signed by Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. But within 48 hours, Islamabad has reportedly responded, “There is no such thing under discussion right now…When the time comes, we will act under the agreement.”

Now it’s time for Saudi Arabia to take more stringent military measures. Diplomacy cannot be used as an instrument to control an ideology-driven militia group. In April this year, Saudi Arabia’s critical pipeline to the Red Sea was attacked by Iran, cutting 700,000 barrels per day and now by the Houthis. The Houthi advance towards Bab el-Mandeb significantly alters Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the Red Sea. For now, Saudi Arabia’s main pressure is protecting maritime trade and preventing an Iran-aligned armed group from gaining leverage over one of the world’s most important chokepoints.

An image of a torii gate at sunset, a steaming bowl of ramen, or a tatami room glowing in soft light can instantly evoke a traditional experience of Japanese culture. From ikebana to kabuki theatre and ukiyo-e woodblock prints, Japan’s traditional arts have become a global trademark for beauty and minimalism. Areas like anime, manga, cuisine, design, and technology helped Japan to develop an identity and establish its soft power across the world.

The Cool Japan strategy is integral to Japan’s post-war cultural diplomacy. The formation of the Cool Japan initiative was shaped by the global success of a Japanese television drama named Oshin, which aired in the early 1980s. The show became popular in 68 countries. This made Japan realise the potential of cultural exports as a means of nation branding and revenue generation. The official launch of the Cool Japan Project came in 2013, with the launch of the Cool Japan Fund, saw an initial investment of ¥50 billion over a span of 20 years. The fund has one clear direction: to promote and finance projects that promote Japanese culture abroad, increasing tourism, boosting foreign investment, and expanding the market reach for Japanese products.

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry planned to dissolve the public-private Cool Japan Fund, formally the Fund Corporation for the Overseas Promotion of Japan’s Culture. The government-led investments failed to generate the expected returns, and Cool Japan’s losses began to pile up. The fund invested not only in content such as animation and games but also in restaurants, department stores and fashion, yet many of those ventures fell short of expected profits. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the initiative in 2010 and set up the Cool Japan Fund to handle related investments in 2013. Japanese officials had said the policy was influenced by the “Cool Britannia” campaign under British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government, though it was also seen as a response to the global rise of the Korean Wave.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government has continued its support for the content industry even after the Cool Japan Initiative fund was discontinued. It was listed along as one of the core industries, along with AI and semiconductors. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has unveiled a plan to set up a new investment quota for 17 growth areas, ensuring sufficient budget allocations by exempting the 17 sectors from the rule limiting financing for related project funds to three years in principle. Takaichi’s first economic blueprint, compiled in July, says the government will seek to work with ​the private sector to channel resources into strategic industries, with combined public and private investment projected to exceed 370 ​trillion yen ($2.4 trillion) through fiscal 2040. This economic transformation also has an important foreign-policy dimension by building a regional environment favourable to its long-term national interests

Taking a look at Tokyo’s foreign policy agenda, Ms Takaichi Sanae in Hanoi, Vietnam, delivered a speech, announcing Japan’s updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”. It prioritises three areas of initiative for FOIP that is Building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data, including strengthening supply chain resilience for energy and critical materials; co-creation of economic growth opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule-sharing; and enhancing cooperation in the field of security to ensure regional peace and stability. She expressed her conviction that, through these efforts, Japan and the entire Indo-Pacific region, including ASEAN, can become “stronger and more prosperous together.”

Takaici cited the following initiatives in the ASEAN region: (1) strengthening supply chain resilience through the “POWERR Asia”; (2) AI cooperation under the “Japan-ASEAN Co-Creation Initiative for AI”; (3) the FOIP Digital Corridor Concept including undersea cables, Open RAN, satellite communications, and all-optical networks, among others; (4) the expansion of the CPTPP; and (5) cooperation in the security field, including in the maritime domain, through OSA, ODA, and other frameworks. Above all, Japan’s recent defence buildup has been driven by the imperative of concentrating on the security challenges in Asia posed by China and North Korea. Japan’s long-term security establishment has been oriented towards deterrence and defence in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has refrained toward participation in military operations in the Middle East or any other distant areas.

Culture remains an important asset, but it is treated alongside semiconductors, artificial intelligence, resilient supply chains and defence capabilities as an instrument of national power. Takaichi has been seen focusing on regional security issues as well as updating strategic culture to boost growth and revenue generation. As her term is completing next year, it is essential to observe how Japan shapes its national interest and strategically plans its regional goals.

Over the past two decades, BRICS has grown into a major platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing countries, with an ever-expanding role in global affairs. As the chair this year, India will be hosting the 18th BRICS Summit on September 12-13 at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. The summit will bring together leaders of BRICS member and partner countries as well as outreach invitees, according to the Ministry of External Affairs.

The theme for India’s BRICS chairship is ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’. India, a founding member of BRICS, has previously held its chairship in 2012, 2016 and 2021. India assumed its fourth BRICS chairship on January 1, 2026. BRICS is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi on Friday for a three-day visit to India. He is scheduled to participate in the BRICS Summit and meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss ways to expand bilateral trade, investment and energy cooperation. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov in an online interaction with India-based journalists organised by Russian media outlet Sputnik India, described BRICS as a flexible club organised around policy and security, economics and finance, and cultural and humanitarian cooperation. On multipolarity in BRICS, he said the ideology and the nature of BRICS correspond with the ideology of a “multipolar world” because cooperation in BRICS is based on “mutual trust, mutual respect, mutual benefits in trade”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi from Sept. 12 to 13, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson announced on Thursday. China, as an active supporter and participant in BRICS, has consistently upheld the BRICS Spirit of openness, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation, working with its partners to turn shared aspirations into practical cooperation and advance common development. According to 2026), at the upcoming summit, Xi will join other leaders in charting a new course for the high-quality development of greater BRICS cooperation, pooling the collective strength of the Global South and contributing stability and positive momentum to a world undergoing profound changes.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also landed in New Delhi. Along with these key dignitaries, a lot of other leaders will also join the event. Other stand-ins reportedly under consideration include Uganda's Vice President Jessica Alupo, Vietnam's Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who would attend in place of his father, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Brazil, one of the bloc's founding members, is unlikely to see President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend in person due to the country’s election campaign.

The situation around Iran is the most pressing political issue facing BRICS, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in an interview with TASS. “With regard to Iran, the situation is complicated by the fact that there are countries within BRICS that take a sharply critical stance toward what Tehran is doing and has been doing recently,” Ryabkov said. “The Gulf conflict is going to be the central fault line this time during the BRICS summit,” said Harsh V Pant of India’s Observer Research Foundation. “What was seen until last year as an achievement – the expansion of BRICS – today looks like a big constraint on BRICS”. It will be Pezeshkian’s first visit to India as Iranian president and will put the Middle East conflict firmly on the agenda.

Finance ministers and central bank governors of BRICS countries have called for reform of global developmental financial institutions such as the International ​Monetary Fund and World Bank, seeking a stronger voice for emerging ‌market economies. While acknowledging the work done by the BRICS payment task force, the finance chiefs pushed for progress in ensuring ​greater interoperability of payment systems across member nations. The BRICS ⁠Payment Task Force continues discussions, building on the ongoing work, to facilitate practical solutions for cross-border payments among BRICS countries, with fast, low-cost, ⁠more ​accessible, efficient, transparent, and safe modes. BRICS members will focus on ⁠making international financial institutions more representative, transparent and accountable.

The Economic Times reported earlier that India, which currently holds the BRICS presidency, is likely to present a concept for seamless cross-border digital payments and the introduction of central bank digital currencies among the group’s member states at the summit of the bloc. Reuters reported in January that the Reserve Bank of India had proposed linking the official digital currencies of BRICS countries to facilitate cross-border trade and tourism payments. The proposal could reduce reliance on the dollar, although the RBI has maintained that efforts to internationalise the rupee are not aimed at promoting de-dollarisation.

On September 7, 2026, H.E. Mr. Xu Feihong, Chinese Ambassador to India, published an article entitled “Harnessing BRICS ‘POWER’ to empower the world” in The Hindu, giving an acronym of POWER where P for Principle, O for Openness, W for Win-Win, E for Engine, R for Responsibility. The article focuses on how the world economy is currently facing a sluggish recovery, coupled with the spread of protectionism. Certain countries have undermined the international economic and trade order by erecting tariff barriers, seeking decoupling and disrupting supply chains. It should be recognised that economic globalisation is an inevitable trend of history. BRICS should uphold the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its core, safeguard the basic principles of the WTO such as the most-favoured-nation treatment, and resist all forms of protectionism. We should join hands to deepen cooperation in energy and mineral resources, infrastructure, and industrial and supply chains to maintain an open global economic landscape. It also focuses on accelerating the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, strengthening dialogue and building consensus on launching the formulation of the post-2030 global development agenda. Mr Xu Feihong also focuses on promoting the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) with sectors including science and technology, health, agriculture and education, thereby injecting fresh impetus into world economic growth. China has established the China-BRICS AI Development and Cooperation Centre and the China-BRICS New Quality Productive Forces Research Centre and welcomes the active participation of all parties.

The UAE joined the New Development Bank in October 2021 and formally became a member of BRICS in January 2024, as part of its broader approach to expanding international economic partnerships and strengthening its presence across multilateral economic and financial cooperation platforms. Non-oil foreign trade between the UAE and BRICS economies exceeded $312 billion in 2025, rising 28.5 per cent from $243 billion in the previous year, according to figures highlighted by UAE Minister of Foreign Trade Dr. Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi during the BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in Jaipur in August. BRICS markets accounted for approximately 31 per cent of the UAE’s total non-oil foreign trade in 2025.

Institutions create history. BRICS has completed twenty years expanding its membership, enlarging its economic weight and becoming an increasingly consequential voice of the Global South. Yet power alone does not make a grouping consequential. The harder task is to turn numbers into effectiveness, diversity into cooperation and declarations into outcomes. India has sought to move the grouping from dialogue towards delivery, with five joint declarations, three new centres or platforms and a landmark MOU on standardisation. BRICS has acquired the scale to reflect a changing world, with upcoming responsibility as a leader in the Global South, when the world is facing several conflicts in multiple regions.

Cinema remains one of the most effective tools of soft power, shaping public perception. It offers a human-centric context to geopolitical regions, highlighting shared historical and societal struggles across regions.

Today, I take you through the story of a film, The Rainbow Troops (Laskar Pelangi) that is more than just cinema: a journey of unwavering dedication, quiet resilience, and the courage to keep moving forward when giving up seems easier.

The movie is based on Andrea Hirata’s bestselling novel. It is directed by Riri Riza. The Rainbow Troops (Laskar Pelangi) is one of the most celebrated and award-winning films in Indonesian cinematic history. Set on the resource-rich but economically marginalised island of Belitung in the 1970s, the film follows ten young students and their dedicated teachers, Muslimah Hafsari, the young, devoted primary teacher and Harfan Efendy Noor, the wise, elderly headmaster. Fighting to keep their underfunded village school, SD Muhammadiyah Gantong, alive.

The South Sumatra Department of Education mandates that SD Muhammadiyah Gantong must enrol at least 10 students to remain open. On opening day, only 9 children show up. The headmaster, Pak Harfan, prepares to announce the school's closure, as the students could not meet the standard regulation of a minimum 10 students by government. A boy named Harun (who has special needs) arrives with his mother to enrol as the crucial 10th student. It is shown that every single child's presence matters, saving the school and allowing the "Rainbow Troops" to form.

During a heavy rain in their leaky classroom, the children stay together. After the storm clears, a vivid rainbow stretches across the Belitung sky. Inspired by the scene, their teacher, Muslimah, affectionately names her ten students Laskar Pelangi (The Rainbow Troops). The movie places special emphasis on Ikal, the version of the author himself, Andrea Hirata. Ikal is observant, determined, and deeply imaginative. He is one among the ten students of the school.

Despite their poverty, the students demonstrated incredible talent. The school won local recognition in Belitung when Mahar, a student with the artistic genius of the group, led the class to victory in the annual 17th of August Independence Day carnival. As the school did not have funds, he initiated his creative, low-cost tribal dance performance, which brought applause. Lintang, who was a maths prodigy, single-handedly led SD Muhammadiyah Gantong to win the prestigious inter-school academic quiz competition with his advanced arithmetic skills by defeating the elite private schools in the region.

The school's academic momentum was shaken when Pak Harfan, the headmaster of the school, passed away. This led Muslimah to carry the school's education alone. Instead of giving up, the ten students each day gathered at the school daily without the presence of any teacher. The students quietly taught and encouraged each other to keep studying. Seeing her students' resilience brought her back to teaching. It proved that their love for education was stronger than grief. The movie transitions into an emotional scene when Lintang's father, a poor fisherman, passed away at sea. Because Lintang was the oldest son, he was forced to abandon his education and leave school forever to work to support his younger siblings. He compromised his brilliant academic potential for basic survival.

In the 1980s, the global tin market collapsed, bankrupting the mining giant PN Timah. This forced many families into deeper poverty, showing that natural wealth is temporary, while human capital and education endure and give real freedom.

Years later, Ikal reunites with Lintang, now a married labourer struggling financially. Ikal tells him he earned a higher education degree and won a prestigious European scholarship to pursue his master's degree at the Université de Paris (Sorbonne) in France, fulfilling the collective dreams of his childhood classmates and honouring the legacy of SD Muhammadiyah Gantong.

The ending of the movie shows how education transforms lives and teaches you to dream big and achieve upward social mobility. It shows both the tragic loss of unfulfilled potential (Lintang) and the transformative power of perseverance (Ikal). It reinforces that access to proper education is a fundamental human right and that everyone deserves a fair chance to upgrade their lives.

Hours of sirens, sleepless nights, and the anticipation of another attack have brought mental exhaustion to the people of Ukraine. On August 1, 2026, Russian forces fired around 30 ballistic missiles at Kyiv. Ukrainian state authorities reported nine dead and many injured after the strikes, including reports of damage to five districts—Solomianskyi, Darnytskyi, Shevchenkivskyi, Dniprovskyi, and Pecherskyi. Russia has conducted multiple mass strikes with drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and one-way attack drones, causing significant damage in the region.

The Russian Defence Ministry said its forces carried out a “massive” strike on targets in nine Ukrainian cities that began after nightfall on August 26, 2026. It described the targets as military-related, including industrial facilities, oil refineries, logistics hubs and port infrastructure. In a span of a week, Kyiv endured 76 air raid alerts. Analysts say Russia's aim is not only to weaken Kyiv's morale but also to damage Ukraine's economy by targeting businesses and warehouses.

Russian forces are using long-range firepower and have been sending small groups of Shahed-type drones toward Kyiv at regular intervals, sometimes only 30 to 60 minutes apart, stretching air raid alerts across much of the day and repeatedly disrupting transportation, businesses and logistics. Initially designed in Iran, Shahed drones are now manufactured by Russia using engines from various sources, including China. The Shahed-238 Loitering Munition, a new advanced version, includes a mix of software-defined radios and other guidance systems that make it harder to jam. A jet-powered variant of the Shahed, the Geran3, with a range of 1,533 miles, has been produced, making the warfare more advanced. Russia also used S-400 missiles for ground attack. The S-400 was designed as a long-range air defence system. Its missiles are mainly used to intercept threats in the air. With vast Soviet-era stockpiles for Russia, converting S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles into ground-attack weapons is a practical solution.

When Russia from the Vologda region launched 61 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles in Ukraine, Ukrainian F-16 fighters shot down 38 of 54 intercepted cruise missiles during a July 30, 2026 Russian attack of 61 missiles. Ukraine’s older Soviet-era jets, the MiG-29s and Su-27s that formed the backbone of Ukrainian airpower, were replaced by American-made jets F16. Ukraine has formally asked the European Union to use its €90 billion support loan to help fund the purchase of US-made PAC-3 interceptor missiles for its Patriot air-defence systems, as Kyiv faces a critical shortage of interceptors.

Ukraine is set to receive next-generation SAMP/T systems and additional air defence missiles by the end of the year as part of Italy’s latest military aid package, the Italian outlet La Repubblica reported on Aug. 26. It includes four SAMP/T NG air defence batteries, Aster 30 interceptor missiles, and seven long-range radars, which are funded through European Union loans. Paris and Rome have also agreed to authorise the production of French-Italian Aster 30 N1BT interceptor missile systems in Ukraine. Project Freyja is a Ukrainian-led effort to develop a European anti-ballistic missile system, with a prototype expected by mid-2027. With an open-architecture "system of systems," it integrates with existing NATO-standard radars, command posts, and data links rather than functioning as a standalone national system. The project’s stated aim is to deliver a lower-cost, higher-volume European alternative to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 for intercepting ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian defence company Fire Point has moved its FP-7 tactical ballistic missile into the military testing phase, bringing the system closer to certification and possible entry into service. The FP-7 is designed to carry a 150 kg payload with range of up to 300 km, a maximum speed of about 1,500 meters per second, and a circular error probable of roughly 14 meters. It is a lower-cost alternative to the U.S. ATACMS.

At this point, Kyiv must plan for a winter with severely disrupted power and disrupted life-support systems such as water, sanitation, power. Ukraine is developing ways to attack the Russian production facilities, but these factories are very well guarded. Technology alone has never won wars, but mediation and peace treaties have. As Ukraine contributed to its own success through the courage and aggression of its fighter pilots and the adaptability of its GBAD systems. Timely and sufficient deliveries of air-defence systems and munitions to Ukraine are crucial to sustaining Russian attacks. As European nations have heavily supplied and supported Ukraine, they cannot act as a mediator in this situation. The US has been trying to start peace initiatives, but for ages, the US and Russia have fought an ideological battle, which might affect the outcome at present.

World Robot Conference in Beijing on Aug 19. Photo: REUTERS

Investors are placing enormous bets on what robots could eventually become over time, since two agile humanoid robots traded roundhouse kicks and punches, a less nimble robot spent nearly two minutes trying to fold a T-shirt and a humanoid robot, Tiangong Ultra, achieved a remarkable feat at the World Humanoid Robot Games in Beijing by clocking 9.39 seconds in the 100m sprint, surpassing Usain Bolt’s world record of 9.58 seconds.

Tiangong Ultra, developed by the Beijing Humanoid Robot Innovation Centre, won the race by overtaking smartphone maker Honor's robot, Lightning, near the finish. Both robots crashed into a thick mat positioned to stop them, with Tiangong veering wildly off course into the sidelines and forcing spectators to clear out of the way, while Lightning collapsed to the ground and had to be carried off on a stretcher.

The world’s largest producer of humanoid robots, none other than China, is increasingly putting both its industrial might and capital markets behind the development of humanoid robots. Unitree raised 6.1 billion yuan (S$1.15 billion) in an initial public offering that was more than 8,000 times oversubscribed, making it the first humanoid robot maker to list in mainland China.

A report from Morgan Stanley projects that China's robotics market will more than double from $47 billion in 2024 to $108 billion by 2028, expanding at an annual rate of 23 per cent. China already accounts for about 40 per cent of the global robotics market, underscoring its rising stature as an innovation hub. China has also built a supply chain spanning core chips and key components through to finished products, giving it the foundation to handle everything from design to production on its own.

From a systems engineering perspective, the biggest challenge is moving from a research prototype to a reliable operational system. Many humanoid robots today are somewhere in the middle of that scale. Demonstrations show that the core technology works, but significant effort is still required to make the systems reliable, safe and maintainable in real environments. A general-purpose robot may be flexible, but it may not perform specific tasks as efficiently as a robot designed for that particular task. In many cases, application-specific robots may still be the more practical solution.

China’s lead has been years in the making. The humanoid robot industry was listed as one of the key industrial areas for technological breakthroughs in its 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021. State funding is being used for both testing infrastructure and backing individual companies.

But despite China’s current dominance, the West will not necessarily become reliant on buying Chinese robots, as Tesla has been developing a general-purpose robot called Optimus for over five years. Tesla’s Optimus robots can now perform “simple tasks” inside the company’s factories and can be made accessible to the general public by the end of 2027.

Credits: (AP Photo)

The 55th Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting was held in Koror, Palau. The Pacific Island Nations consist of three major groups of islands named Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. The theme of the meeting was BELAU (“Building Economies: Life. Action. Unity”). This indicated the vision of cooperative regional solidarity on issues of climate change, economic resilience, and maritime security. The week-long summit showcased intense political tension in the region as several leaders pulled out of the Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Palau at the eleventh hour. The Prime Ministers of Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa and the Solomon Islands, along with the President of Kiribati, were seen to be absent from the forum meeting.

Regional consensus within the 18-member PIF is inherently seen as fragile, with disagreements over maritime security and major-power alignments. Only three Pacific countries in the forum, Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, are seen to maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has gradually persuaded several countries to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Ten days prior to the summit, Chinese authorities issued a travel warning to Palau, threatening its tourism sector, which historically depended on China for 40% of its GDP.

Taiwan and its three diplomatic allies in the South Pacific signed a joint statement pledging to work more closely for the betterment of the region and deepen healthcare cooperation with Palau in digital healthcare systems and professional training as Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung concluded a visit to Palau.

Pacific Island leaders expressed concern about China’s ⁠Pacific ⁠missile test at their annual summit, though ⁠Nauru formally dissented, in a meeting largely overshadowed by Beijing’s objections to Taiwan’s presence. Summit host ​and Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. said that China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in July, Beijing’s first known launch in ‌the Pacific since September 2024, was passed over ‌several island nations without adequate warning.

Leaders endorsed the BELAU Declaration for Urgent and Inclusive Climate Action to Keep 1.5°C within Reach, which calls for stronger international action on climate change, greater recognition of the ocean-climate connection and an accelerated transition away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy. Leaders also committed to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels and towards a 100 per cent renewable energy future for the Blue Pacific. They backed the accelerated development of a Regional Renewable Energy Transition Strategy and implementation of the renewed Framework for Energy Security and Resilience in the Pacific, known as FESRIP 2.0.

Leaders called for effective delivery of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, including grants and other non-debt-creating instruments with simplified and direct access arrangements. They also called for urgent action to close the adaptation finance gap, including responding to the UN climate process call to at least triple adaptation finance.

Australia has joined hands with Pacific nations to strengthen regional security, amid increasing transnational and organised crime. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Pacific leaders initiated Waqa Moana. It is a Pacific-led maritime security initiative to counter illicit drug trafficking in the region. This will help to get actionable intelligence into the hands of Pacific police forces and operational responders. Prime Minister Albanese has announced a $600m package of support for crime regulation. Albanese said that the “Pacific is our home and our family” and it is in Australia’s interests to work with Pacific partners.

Pacific island states have outlined their own non-military-related security agenda, including economic integration, climate action, ocean governance, technology, connectivity and institutional reform through this meeting. The matters which reflect responsibility are protecting peace and security architecture, advancing the 2050 International Engagement Strategy, deepening regional integration, preparing for COP31, and ensuring that partnerships continue to serve Pacific priorities.

Mount Anak Krakatau erupting at night. Source: The Jakarta Post

Indonesia is a nation that lies across the equator, spread across a vast archipelago of over 17,000 islands. It lies along the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, which marks the active collision zone of multiple major tectonic plates, specifically the Indo-Australian, Eurasian, and Pacific plates, increasing the chances of natural disasters. With over 120 active volcanoes, Indonesia holds the record for the highest number of active volcanoes in the world. The country’s landscape is a continuous variation between the constructive forces of magma that create fertile soils and the destructive forces of eruptions that displace thousands. Between 2024 and 2026, Indonesia has grabbed the world’s attention as an active volcanic hotspot emerging from the earth’s crust.

The period between 2024 and 2026 has been marked by a significant upsurge in volcanic activity across different islands in the Indonesian archipelago. These eruptions have not only impacted local communities but have also caused severe international disruptions, particularly in aviation and global travel.

The Awakening of Anak Krakatau (September 2026)

In September 2026, Mount Anak Krakatau, located in Indonesia's Sunda Strait between the main Java and Sumatra islands erupted and caused major problems worldwide. Its name means "Child of Krakatoa," named after the famous volcano Krakatoa that violently blew up in 1883. When the older Krakatoa erupted, it pushed out so much lava that its underground chamber emptied, causing the mountain to collapse in on itself and form a massive, bowl-shaped crater called a caldera. In 1927, the new volcano began growing straight out of the ocean from inside that underwater crater. During this recent September eruption, the young volcano shot a giant cloud of ash 50,000 feet high into the sky.

Volcanic ash spread across parts of Jakarta and Lampung province on Sumatra's southern tip, Indonesia's Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation said. AirNav Indonesia closed airspace around Soekarno-Hatta and Halim Perdanakusuma airports in Jakarta, as well as six other airports, including Radin Inten II Airport in Lampung, because of volcanic ash. Over 1,500 flights were cancelled, stranding roughly 170,000 passengers and disrupting international trade routes. The eruption served as a stark reminder of how a localised geological event can instantaneously paralyse modern global infrastructure.

The Ash of Mount Lewotobi Laki-Laki (2024–2025)

Mount Lewotobi Laki-Laki and its twin, Lewotobi Perempuan, located in eastern Indonesia on the island of Flores, form a volatile volcanic eruption site. Between November 2024 and April 2025, Lewotobi Laki-laki Volcano (1,584 m a.s.l.), situated in Flores Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, exhibited eruptive activity that significantly impacted the surrounding environment. In 1861, the first formally recorded historical eruption of Mount Lewotobi Laki-Laki occurred typically characterised by mild eruptions involving ash emission, lava flows, and dome formation. Eruptions were driven by the subduction of the Indo-Australian plate beneath the Eurasian plate along the Sunda Arc. As trapped water melted mantle rock, silica-rich andesitic magma rose. This thick magma trapped volcanic gases, building intense pressure until explosive blasts launched ash columns, lava flows, and pyroclastic surges across the island.

The July 2025 event was particularly fierce, ejecting an ash cloud 18 kilometres into the sky. Unlike short-lived explosive events, Lewotobi’s prolonged activity has severely impacted the local climate and agriculture. Ashfall blanketed surrounding villages, destroying crops and poisoning water supplies. The Indonesian Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (PVMBG) kept the region on high alert well into 2026, forcing long-term evacuations and disrupting the livelihoods of thousands of farmers who rely on the slopes for agriculture.

The Tsunami Threat of Mount Ruang (April 2024)

In April 2024, the stratovolcano Mount Ruang in North Sulawesi erupted violently at least five times within a matter of days. The eruptions were accompanied by displays of volcanic lightning and pyroclastic flows. The volcanic explosion at Mount Ruang was driven by deep tectonic activity and volatile gas pressure. A series of deep regional earthquakes along the Sangihe Arc subduction zone had fractured rock, allowing gas-rich, silica-heavy magma to ascend rapidly. The trapped explosive gases shattered the summit's central lava dome, blasting ash plumes 19 kilometres into the stratosphere.

Authorities feared that a partial collapse of the volcanic cone into the surrounding sea could displace enough water to generate a massive tsunami a scenario identical to the 2018 Anak Krakatau disaster. A study by Universitas Gadjah Mada revealed that Mount Ruang’s April 2024 eruption was driven by crystal-heavy magma. Densely packed with plagioclase and amphibole crystals (37–87% volume), the magma was too heavy to shoot higher into the sky. Despite a rapid decompression rate of 29 megapascals per second matching Mount Vesuvius, the heavy magma capped ash columns at 9 to 19 kilometres. Additionally, microscopic ash textures confirmed water-magma interactions, while a magnitude 6.5 earthquake in the Maluku Sea triggered the ascent.

Acting swiftly, the government issued maximum-level alerts and evacuated over 20,000 residents from Ruang and the neighbouring remote islands. Recent scientific investigations published in 2026 have highlighted the April 2024 Ruang event as a critical case study in managing complex, multi-hazard volcanic crises in maritime environments.

The Geological History: Why is Indonesia so Volatile?

To understand why Indonesia experiences such frequent and violent volcanic activity, one must look deep beneath the Earth’s surface. Indonesia sits at the complex convergence of three major tectonic plates: the Indo-Australian Plate, the Eurasian Plate, and the Pacific Plate.

The Indo-Australian Plate continuously moves northward, sliding beneath the Sunda Microplate (part of the Eurasian Plate) in a process known as subduction. As the oceanic crust of the Indo-Australian Plate plunges deeper into the Earth’s mantle, extreme heat and pressure squeeze trapped water and gases out of the sinking rock. This released moisture acts as a chemical flux, lowering the melting point of the surrounding mantle rock and generating vast reservoirs of buoyant magma.

Rising through fractures in the crust, this magma steadily absorbs silica from the thick continental rock, turning it viscous and sticky. Because this thick lava seals off volcanic vents, volatile gases cannot escape smoothly. Instead, pressure builds continuously beneath the crater floor until the volcano violently erupts, launching high ash plumes, fast-moving pyroclastic flows, and widespread fallout. Tracing the length of Sumatra, Java, Bali, and the Lesser Sunda Islands, this active subduction zone forms the deeply curved Sunda Arc, the volcanic backbone of Indonesia.

Echoes of the Past: Eruptions that Changed the World

The recent eruptions, while severe, are only echoes of the cataclysmic events that have defined Indonesia’s history.

1. Mount Samalas (1257): For decades, scientists were puzzled by a mysterious spike in sulfur isotopes found in polar ice cores dating back to the 13th century, which coincided with a period of severe global cooling. In 2013, researchers finally unmasked the reason: Mount Samalas on Lombok Island. The 1257 eruption was one of the largest of the Holocene epoch, plunging the globe into a mini-ice age and potentially triggering widespread famine across medieval Europe.

2. Mount Tambora (1815): The eruption of Mount Tambora on the island of Sumbawa remains the deadliest volcanic event in recorded history. The explosion ejected an estimated 160 cubic kilometers of pulverized rock and ash into the atmosphere. The massive injection of sulfur dioxide aerosols blocked sunlight globally, leading to 1816 being dubbed the “Year Without a Summer.” Crops failed across North America and Europe, leading to the worst famine of the 19th century.

3. Krakatoa (1883): Perhaps the most famous of them all, the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa in the Sunda Strait literally tore the island apart. The explosion was so loud it ruptured the eardrums of sailors 40 miles away and was heard as far away as Alice Springs, Australia. The collapse of the volcano generated tsunamis towering over 100 feet, devastating coastal communities in Java and Sumatra and killing over 36,000 people.

The Dual Nature of Volcanism: Source of Livelihood

Given this terrifying history, one might wonder why millions of Indonesians choose to live in the shadow of active volcanoes. The answer lies in the unique dual nature of volcanism.

While volcanoes bring destruction, they are also the ultimate source of life in the archipelago. Volcanic ash is incredibly rich in minerals like phosphorus, potassium, and calcium. When this ash breaks down, it creates Andisols, some of the most fertile soils on the planet, formed from weathered volcanic ash, tephra, and volcanic glass. This extraordinary fertility allows islands like Java to support dense populations through intensive rice agriculture. Furthermore, the immense subterranean heat provides Indonesia with vast geothermal energy potential, a crucial resource as the country transitions toward renewable energy.

Volcanoes also fuel local economies and shape daily life across Indonesia. Eruptions deposit rich mineral stores, enabling workers to harvest sulfur directly from active crater floors like East Java’s Kawah Ijen for sugar refining, matches, and rubber vulcanisation. Nearby communities actively quarry volcanic basalt, granite, and hardened ash to build local infrastructure and roads.

Simultaneously, volcanic landscapes generate significant eco-tourism revenue. Iconic destinations like Mount Bromo’s vast sand sea, Kawah Ijen’s turquoise acid lake, and Mount Rinjani attract thousands of global trekkers annually, creating essential jobs for guides, drivers, hospitality workers, and park rangers. Furthermore, indigenous groups treat volcanoes as spiritual sanctuaries. Communities like the Tenggerese host annual rituals such as Yadnya Kasada, casting agricultural offerings into Mount Bromo’s crater to express gratitude and secure prosperity, cementing a profound cultural bond with these hazardous peaks.

The Monitoring and Mitigation of Volcanic Events

Scientists are rapidly improving their understanding of Indonesia’s magma plumbing systems. Pioneering 2021 oxygen isotope analyses of pyroxene crystals along the Sunda Arc revealed how magma interacts with continental crust and deep mantle dynamics before erupting. Additionally, researchers now model how large-scale tectonic earthquakes compress magma chambers to trigger sudden eruptions.

The Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (PVMBG) regularly uses satellite Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) and tiltmeters to detect sub-millimeter ground swelling weeks before magma reaches the surface. Monitoring teams fly specialized drones into active crater plumes to measure shifting ratios of carbon dioxide (CO2) and sulfur dioxide (SO2), generating early warnings without risking human lives. Civil engineers use high-resolution LiDAR mapping to build concrete sabo dams, earthen dikes, and channels around high-risk peaks like Mount Merapi, safely guiding destructive volcanic mudflows away from towns. AirNav Indonesia works with the Darwin Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) to process real-time satellite imagery, generating 3D airspace exclusion zones to reroute commercial jets safely around ash plumes. Indonesia actively taps its active volcanic systems such as Kamojang, Dieng, and Salak drilling deep wells into superheated hydrothermal systems to generate renewable electricity while lowering subsurface fluid pressure.

Recent activity such as Mount Ruang’s 2024 blasts and the major September 2026 eruption of Anak Krakatau demonstrates these systems in action. Plumes from Anak Krakatau reached 50,000 feet, grounding flights across Jakarta. However, automated platforms like MAGMA Indonesia, satellite monitoring, and rapid evacuation protocols actively minimise casualties. Indonesia continues to balance rich, life-giving volcanic fertility against the timely eruptions that disrupt daily lives.